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The present study validates the new construct “Multi-governance choices”, to sharpen our 
understanding of how and why smallholder farmers select among alternative governance structures. 
Primary data were collected from a sample of 219 pineapple farmers in Southern Benin. Results from a 
multivariate probit model analysis showed that farmers involved in outgrowing schemes were less 
likely to be involved in other type of governance structure, indicating the specificity of this type of 
transaction arrangement in Beninese pineapple supply chain. Results also show that the specificity of 
the investments, transaction connectedness, market stability, institutional support and market 
attributes are key factors affecting the choice of governance structure. The study suggests that further 
research is needed into the impact of selected governance structures on pineapple quality and farmer’s 
income. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, pineapple production has 
increased more than four-fold from 50,000 tons in 2000 to 
222,000 tons in 2009 in Benin (World Bank, 2010). 
Production is consumed locally (35%), exported in the 
sub-region (40%), and processed into juice (15%). 
Regional exports in dried form are 8% and exports to the 
European Union share only 2% (GTZ and MAEP, 2008). 
It is estimated that the value of pineapple production in 
2006 amounted to €19.8 Millions (4.3% of agricultural 
GDP and 2.1% of the total GDP) and the number of direct 
and indirect jobs created in the value chain were 15,000 
and 25,000, respectively. The success of the pineapple 
supply chains is of high importance for Benin. Pineapple 
production  follows  a   two-year   cycle   and   requires   a  
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significant level of investment often beyond the financial 
capacity of the individual smallholder. For smallholders to 
make profit from selling in local, regional and export 
markets, they have established bi- or multilateral forms of 
governance structures. Within the existing portfolio of 
governance structures in the pineapple supply chain 
(PSC) ranging from spot market to collective actions, 
farmers are simultaneously making several choices for 
access to pineapple – characterised by various quality 
levels sold in different markets.  
Considering the lack of scientific evidence on the 
determinant and factors affecting multiple choices of 
governance structure, it becomes necessary to 
investigate the following questions: (i) in a context of 
different governance structures (GS) alternative choice, 
are the farmers‟ selections independent or related? and 
(ii) what are the intrinsic (farm and farmers 
socioeconomic  characteristics)  and  extrinsic   (enabling 
 
 
 
 
institutional support, market and transaction attributes) 
factors affecting the governance structure choices in the 
PSC? 
From the transaction cost theory (TCT) perspective, the 
rational farmer will chose a governance structure that is 
best performing in minimizing the production and 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Failures have been 
reported of projects that had potential to reduce 
transaction costs such as contract farming (Glover and 
Kusterer, 1990), cooperatives and producers‟ 
associations (Bijman and Wollni, 2008). 
Traditional economic theories on comparative 
advantage of the supplier in selecting the governance 
structure have significantly contributed to understanding 
trade at local and international levels, but do not fully 
explain how the multiple choices of governance 
structures by chain actors can be explained with 
empirical evidence.  
The added-value (specificity) from this paper is that it 
simultaneously considers both intrinsic (firm and farmers 
characteristics) and extrinsic (enabling environment, 
transaction attributes) constructs to explain the choice of 
governance structure. The study contributed to validate a 
new construct, namely “Multi-governance”, the 
simultaneous use of more than one governance 
structure, to deepen the understanding of how and why 
farmers select governance structures in less developed 
countries.  
Under transaction cost theory, the paper helps in 
understanding the major reasons guiding the choice of 
chain governance structure in pineapple supply chain 
using a broader range of explanatory factors than 
previous studies. The study provided empirical evidence 
in the transaction cost theory and the choice of 
governance structure, as well as the consideration of the 
connectedness of the transaction as a determinant 
construct of transaction attribute in explaining the choice 
of governance structure. 
 
 
Theoretical background 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is an approach for the 
study of economic systems and organizations. TCE is 
based on an integrated perspective of institutions, the law 
and economics (Rao, 2003). The contribution of Coase
1
 
(1937) marked the starting point of the recognition of the 
role of transaction costs in the theory of the firms. The 
main approach of TCE is, as Williamson (1989) 
suggested, to assign attribute differentiated transactions 
to governance structures in a transaction-cost-minimizing 
manner.  
Transaction cost was interpreted broadly as the 
comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring 
task completion under alternative governance structures'. 
                                                 
1 Coase, with his concept of institutional structures of production has extended 
his analysis of the nature of the firm to all modes of organizations  
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In another perspective, North (1990) described these as 
'the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is 
being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and 
policing and enforcing agreements'. 
These definitions indicate the prior focus of TCE on the 
institutions and evolution of governance structures in 
relation to the role of transaction costs. In other words, 
TCE primarily focuses on the costs involved in making 
transactions rather than the costs of producing a product.  
Production cost for a particular task/function is the cost 
of performing that task, and is borne by the firm 
performing it. Several factors affect production costs 
including resource requirements, scale effects, and buyer 
experience. However, transaction costs are known as the 
costs allocated to write, monitor, and enforce the 
contract. These costs include the costs of running a 
market-based system, or the costs associated with the 
allocation of tasks to external agencies or outsourcing 
(Bello et al., 1997).  
According to Williamson‟s transaction cost framework 
(Williamson, 1991), the magnitude of the transaction 
costs is determined by some key attributes including 
specific investments, level of uncertainty, bounded 
rationality and connectedness of the transaction. 
Governance is viewed in terms of the design of the 
particular mechanisms supporting an economic 
transaction where there is an exchange of property rights. 
TCE tries to derive the optimal governance structure 
under a certain set of situational contingencies (Barney 
and Hesterly, 1999). 
Under TCE reasoning, a continuum of three major 
forms of governance structures, ranging from spot-market 
and hybrid exchanges to vertical integration known as 
hierarchical governance structure, are distinguished 
(Figure 1). Hybrid forms of governance structures include 
bilateral contracts (classical, neo-classical and relational 
contract arrangements), networks (collective trading, 
partnership) and alliances (cooperatives, join venture).  
Following Williamson (1985), in case of a high level of 
collaboration and relationship between buyer and seller 
the GS will be close to the vertical integration mode, 
whereas in cases of lower levels of relationship, the GS 
will be close to the spot-market mode. In the TCE 
framework, the costs of any transaction comprise the ex 
ante and ex post costs. 
Ex ante costs are incurred before and during the 
transactions, such as search costs, information costs, 
and the costs of negotiating and developing a contract or 
agreement. 
Ex post costs are the costs that rise after the 
transactions, such as the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing contracts or agreements (Williamson, 1996). Ex 
post transaction costs, also known as 'coordination costs' 
among organizational theorists (Douma and Schreuder, 
2002), are resources utilized for creation, including the 
maintenance, and the use of institutions and organizations 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2000).  
Following  insight  of  Coase
  
(1937),  Williamson (1985) 
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Figure 1. Continuum of governance structures in the chain. Source: Adapted from Ménard (2004) and Pascucci (2010). 
 
 
 
has elaborated tools for exploring the mechanisms of 
governance based on these contributions, a significant 
amount of knowledge has accumulated about the 
different structures that can support and secure 
transactions.  
Several factors influence the choice of a mode of 
governance structure by actors involved in a transaction. 
The anticipated complexity of decomposing tasks among 
partners and of coordinating across organizational 
boundaries is a major factor in the choice of a specific 
mode of governance and in the design of mechanisms for 
monitoring the arrangement (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
The influence of the institutional environment on the 
choice a governance structure is still unclear in the 
literature (Hobbs, 1997; Ménard, 2004). Regarding the 
number of parties to be included in the arrangement that 
involves a difficult trade-off between bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, chain actors have to make a 
decision. The bilateral arrangements are easier to 
monitor but involve higher dependency; while the 
multilaterals make the management of the relationship 
more complex, but allow comparisons and benchmarking, 
a powerful tool for constraining opportunism (Menard, 
2004). 
However, as for how interactions are undertaken 
among agents, North (1981, 1990 and 1991) has insisted 
on the importance of the rules of the game for 
understanding how actors play that game, choosing ways 
to organize transactions.  
Williamson (1991) went a step further in introducing the 
possibility of shifts in parameters that could explain 
changes in the mode of governance at the micro level. 
Based on Williamson‟s model, Oxley (1999) has 
developed an econometric test, showing how the legal 
definition and the implementation of property rights 
significantly influence the choice between equity and 
market-based contracts in hybrid arrangements designed 
for transferring technologies.  
Economics started with a dichotomist view between 
systems based on decentralized decisions and systems 
planned from the centre, expressed in various but similar 
ways: „markets and plans‟ (Coase, 1937), „markets and 
hierarchies‟ (Williamson, 1975), „hierarchies and 
polyarchies‟ (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).  
As    stated    by    Grandori  (1997),   a   third   type   of  
governance form has been added: clans (Ouchi, 1980), 
trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), democratic poliarchies 
(Lindblom, 1977), networks (Thompson et al., 1991 and 
many others), and constitutional ordering (Sabel, 1993). 
These categorizations have been proposed, but they are 
difficult to compare properly with the two types of markets 
and hierarchies (Grandori, 1997). Therefore, the growing 
literature on the class organizations known as hybrid 
forms of governance structure, standing between markets 
and hierarchies, raises important questions about their 
nature and role in a market economy.  
A previous study (Arinloye et al., 2010) on the 
pineapple supply chain in Benin identified additional 
market type governance structures, and three other types 
of governance structure falling into the hybrid class 
namely relational based GS, outgrowing schemes, and 
the farmers‟ organisation type of GS. 
 
 
Empirical measurement of the governance structures 
 
First of all, the governance structure indicates the type of 
inter-relation agreement that is used between farmers 
and traders. Different forms of chain governance are 
considered. They include spot market relationship, the 
reputational based arrangement, the outgrowing scheme 
(minority holdings) and collective actions (producers‟ 
organisations).  
As argued before in our propositions, these modes of 
transaction arrangements incorporate a full range of 
governance structures that can be ranked along the 
continuum between arms-length arrangements and full 
integration (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; van de Vrande 
et al., 2009; Williamson, 1985).  
Each of the types of governance structure is 
considered as a multiple choice equation system, where 
farmers have a possibility to select one or more than one 
GS among the four possible alternatives. The following 
are the descriptions of the different GS types in the 
pineapple supply chain: 
 
Spot market GS: It is characterised by a handshaking 
and one shot and unrepeated relationship between buyer 
and seller (Williamson, 1985). 
Relational-based GS: It  is  an  informal form contracting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hybrid governance 
structures 
Spot market    Vertical 
  integration 
| Bilateral contract   | Networks      | Alliance              | 
 
 
 
 
based on relation and previous experiences between 
buyer-seller (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Gibbons et al., 
1994; Menard, 2004). It is classified under bilateral form 
of governance structure (Pascucci, 2010) and raises the 
issue of trust in the transaction. Several authors see trust 
as a way to secure transactions when contracts are 
incomplete (Zucker, 1986; Bradach and Eccles, 1989). 
This reputational selection is guided by familial and/or 
friendship relations between both parties and the 
transactions are characterised by a high level of trust and 
commitment. 
Outgrowing scheme GS: It is considered as bilateral 
contract farming between small farmers and processors 
or traders. It implies that the buyer has a high control in: 
(1) controlling production and harvesting practices on the 
farm to ensure pineapple quality, (2) providing the farmer 
with a loan to buy inputs and accomplish the production 
on time, (3) giving inputs (growing material, Ethephon
2
, 
fertilizers, etc.) directly to farmers, and (4) training and 
monitoring farmers on good production practices 
(Brüntrup and Peltzer, 2006). This type of GS is generally 
accomplished under short or medium term contracts (one 
harvest or one production cycle) and falls under 
marketing specification, resource-providing and product 
management types of contracts (Baumann, 2000). The 
emphasis here is on partners monitoring and controlling 
their actions and decisions through specific and 
identifiable organizational devices that they have 
intentionally designed and agreed upon. 
Farmers’ association GS: It implies that the farmer is 
membership of an organization that provides all needed 
assistance through (1) monitoring, (2) grouped selling, (3) 
assisting members in finding markets, and (4) social 
assistances. Farmers‟ association can easily benefit from 
extension service and financial supports. This form of 
governance is characterised by long term contracts, it 
generally lasts as long as your membership of the 
association is still valid (Wennink and Heemskerk, 2006). 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Research model 
 
In the research model, different factors are hypothesized to affect 
the choice for a particular chain governance structure. They include 
(1) the socio-economical characteristics of the actors and the firms, 
(2) the transaction attributes (including asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and connectedness of the transactions) and (3) the institutional 
environment (Figure 2).  
 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
The firm characteristics3 include the following constructs: 
geographical location (distance between production area and 
market),  farm  size  (hectares),  ratio of land dedicated to pineapple 
                                                 
2 Ethephon is a chemical product with substantial commercial value as a plant 
growth regulator with a trade name Ethrel. The chemical name of this 
compound is 2-Chloroethylphosphonic-acid (Qu et al., 2004) 
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growing to the total cultivated land). Other major factors are related 
to the actors‟ dynamic capabilities (that is, capability to cope with 
the changes in market and environment and to satisfy customers‟ 
needs), age, trust and commitment between farmer and buyer.  
Farmers feel safer in a market setting where they maintain long-
term relationships with their buyers (Lu, 2007). Moreover, the farm 
size is expected to have a positive relationship with farmers‟ 
decision process as shown by various studies (Akinola, 1987; 
Polson and Spencer, 1991). This leads to hypothesize that large 
scale farmers who located far away from the market place will be 
likely to be involved in long-term relations and more integrated 
chain governance structures. 
 
 
Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which non-fungible assets 
are tied to particular transactions specified by contracts or other 
forms of commitment (Williamson, 1985). Assets are specific to a 
particular use if the returns they provide are valuable only in that 
use, relative to any alternative use. The degree of asset specificity 
may be assessed in terms of the investment value that is lost when 
the asset is switched from its intended use to an alternative use.  
Based on these three assumptions, TCE explicitly considers the 
efficiency implications of adopting governance mechanisms in 
transactions. Williamson identified site, physical, human, temporal 
and dedicated asset specificity as distinct types of transaction-
specific investments. In the present study focus was on the human 
and investment assets specificity.  
Human asset specificity refers to relation-specific „know-how‟ 
developed between actors involved in the transaction. As defined 
by Heide and John (1992), human asset specificity addresses 
areas such as empirical knowledge specific to a particular supplier's 
product, or it is the time and effort that goes into learning about a 
supplier's specific requirements (Artz and Brush, 2000). Following 
Williamson, we operationalized human asset specificity using 
different constructs: membership of a pineapple farmers‟ 
association, investment on education, and the experience 
cumulated across the year in pineapple farming. The evidence is 
that the probability of choosing a hierarchical form of governance 
structure is significantly and positively influenced by the human and 
physical specificity. When the specificity of the asset is high, the risk 
for actors to be facing a hold-up (non-transferability) problem is 
great.  
Menard (2004) stated that the likelihood of contract-based 
arrangements is even higher when weak uncertainty combines with 
investments that cannot be redeployed for another transaction. This 
may lead the farmers to choose an integrated form of governance 
structure in order to protect their investment. It can therefore be 
assumed that the greater the human and asset specificities, the 
more likely the actors will be involved in an integrated form of 
governance structure. 
 
 
Uncertainty 
 
When transactions are conducted under uncertainty, it can become 
very costly or impossible to anticipate all contingencies (Frank and 
Henderson, 1992). The theory states that uncertainty causes firm 
leaders to rely more on nonmarket coordination methods. Also, the  
greater the uncertainty in the market, the more the actors restrict 
their range of possible exchange partners to those with whom they 
have had prior interactions and have transacted in the past (March, 
1988; Podolny, 1994). It is therefore important to determine the 
types of transaction uncertainty that affect the choice of governance 
structure.  
As stated by Ruben et al. (2007), the more uncertain the 
environment  of  the  supply chain, the more “central” governance is 
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Figure 2. Research model. 
 
 
 
needed to guarantee that the outlet selection objectives of all 
stakeholders are attained. High uncertainty may discourage a 
supplier from making specialised asset investments if appropriate 
safeguards are absent (Lu, 2007).  
To measure the uncertainty, we used information about the 
stability of the price, the quality and quantity of pineapples delivered 
to buyers over the time. The pineapple producers may be part of a 
contractual arrangement for producing specific labelled products 
(organic or fair trade pineapples for EU markets) that require 
specific investments, and at the same time maintain other 
production, not included in the agreements, to which they can 
switch. When they have this capacity to reduce uncertainties 
associated with the agreement, they adopt a mode of governance 
close to market arrangements (Sauvee, 2000, 2002). Hence, the 
higher the uncertainty with respect to price, quality and quantity, the 
more integrated is the governance structure. 
 
 
Connectedness 
 
Transactions differ in how they are connected to other transactions, 
especially those involving investments which are highly specific. It is 
possible that the assets or service they yield are strongly 
complementary. Some transactions are largely dependent on 
others giving rise to hold-up problem and locked-in effects (Slangen 
et al., 2008).  
An example of connectedness is the relation between water and 
an irrigation system. A strong relationship exists between both 
assets. Without water, the irrigation system is useless and also in 
the other way around. This raises the question of property right, 
ownership and the best governance structure. When the involved 
parties have divergent interests, the coordination problem becomes 
more difficult increasing the transaction cost.  
For understanding the behaviour of any single supplier within a 
supply chain, the two critical characteristics of ties in a supply chain 
are the supplier‟s dependence on the dominant buyer and the 
connectedness  to  the  other  network  of  suppliers   (Cook,   1977; 
Provan, 1993). When the supplier‟s dependence on the buyer is 
high, it results in high cooperation (Provan, 1993). Also when 
transactions involve a high degree of connectedness to other 
transactions, or are executed in small batches, or occur over short 
periods of time, there will be increasing coordination costs (Bogetoft 
and Olesen, 2004; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Wood and Parr, 
2005).  
When the transactions have a strong connection, a strong 
coordination mechanism is favourable. The need for such 
mechanisms influences the transaction costs (Meyer et al., 1992). 
The stronger the ties between the buyer-seller, the higher the 
transaction connectedness will be (Wong and Chan, 1999).  
In the present research, we measure the transaction 
connectedness with the following constructs: awareness of chain 
actors of the quality required by the customers of their buyers and 
the awareness of the price paid by them, and the connectedness of 
the harvesting period to the demands of traders and consumers‟ 
demand. We assume that the higher the degree of transaction 
connectedness, the more likely it is that the actor is involved in a 
more integrated GS. 
 
 
Institutional environment 
 
Institutions refer to a broad range of meanings and are often used 
confusedly. Douglass North has been one of the first scholars to 
link institutions and economic performance. The works of Davis and 
North (1971) and North (1990) are quite enlightening to understand 
how institutions affect economies and economic agents. He 
distinguishes between the institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements.  
The institutional environment sets the rules of the game of 
human interactions and the institutional arrangements are the 
players of the game. The institutional environment can be either 
formal (public, legal, governmental) or informal (social, moral). 
Institutions enable, constrain and direct human interaction (Nelson 
and  Sampat, 2001). They reduce uncertainty by setting the rules of 
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the game and hence creating a stable structure to human 
interaction allowing decreasing transaction costs.  
Several authors have argued that the relative importance of 
formal institutions increases as the scope of market exchange 
broadens and deepens (Dixit, 2004; Fafchamps, 2006). One reason 
is that setting up formal institutions requires high fixed costs but low 
marginal costs, whereas informal institutions have high marginal 
costs. Examples of formal institutions can be credit institutions, 
property rights, constitutions, etc. Informal institutions rather refer to 
norms of behavior, conventions, self imposed codes of conduct, 
reputation, etc.  
In the present study, we consider the influence of an enabling 
institutional environment such as institutional support, good control 
agronomical practices and capacity building, quality control (norms 
and standards) services, market facilities, subsidies etc. and how 
these can influence the farmer‟ choice of one (or more) governance 
structure in pineapple supply chain. 
 
 
Survey design 
 
Questionnaires were elaborated to collect data needed to assess 
factors affecting the choice of a governance structure in the 
pineapple supply chain. The questionnaires were designed based 
on the theoretical background and the information from previous 
studies on the Benin PSC (Arinloye et al., 2010, personal 
communication).  
Questionnaires were pre-tested with 10 key informants in Allada 
and Cotonou districts. The pre-test allowed adjusting the 
questionnaire with focus on relevant questions. In addition, 7-point 
Likert scale was changed to a 5-point scale (1 = not agree at all, to 
5 = totally agree), to make them better suited to a low literacy level 
of the people to be interviewed.  
 
 
Data collection 
 
Data were collected by face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The 
respondents were selected using the following criteria: acreage 
under pineapple cultivation in 2009, that is, small scale (< 1 ha), 
medium scale (between 1 to 5 ha) and large scale (> 5 ha), 
membership of an integrated/spot market governance regime (with 
and without contract, cooperation, organisation, outgrowing, etc.), 
distance to urban market (located in Cotonou), and trading with 
exporters or regional market sellers (from Nigeria). Other factors as 
such stated by Campbell's (1955), of being knowledgeable about 
the phenomenon under study as well as being able and willing to 
communicate with the researcher, also constituted major selecting 
criteria of respondents.  
In Table the study presents an overview of the number of 
respondents in each category. Data was collected between 
September 2009 and July 2010. As more than 95% of pineapples 
produced in Benin are coming from the Atlantique Department 
(district), respondents were randomly selected from this area, 
based on the aforementioned criteria, using a randomly stratified 
sampling3 scheme. Pineapple farmers were traced with the 
assistance  of  the agricultural extension services department in the 
 
                                                 
3 Stratified sampling is commonly used probability method that is superior to a 
simple random sampling as it reduces sampling error. A stratum (or criteria) is 
a subset of the population that share at least one common characteristic. 
Examples of stratums might be the farm size, or members and non-members of 
association (StatPac, 2010). We first identified the relevant criteria and their 
actual representation for a sufficient number of subjects. "Sufficient" refers to a 
sample size large enough for us to be reasonably confident that the stratum 
represents the population of pineapple farmers estimated at 4,000 in 2010 by 
extension service agents in Atlantique department. 
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Atlantique region, which provided the name list of farmers in each 
district.  
The second source of information on pineapple farmers was the 
pineapple producers‟ association and councils. Equally, important 
was information from the literature review. In total 219 farmers were 
interviewed across Ze (rural), Abomey-Calavi (peri-urban), Allada 
(rural), Toffo (rural), and Tori-Bossito (rural) representing the main 
pineapple production zone in Benin (Table 1). 
 
 
Analytical approach 
 
The study intends to explain the effect of internal and external 
factors (transaction attributes, social capital, institutional 
environment and socio-economic characteristics) on governance 
structure and outlet choice, and therefore two dependent variables 
are investigated. 
As one actor can be involved in one or more than one type of 
governance structure, we found it appropriate to use a multivariate 
probit model to analyse the determinants of governance structure in 
the pineapple supply chain in Benin. Multivariate probit estimates 
M-equation probit models, by the method of maximum simulated 
likelihood (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003).  
The variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms 
has values of 1 on the leading diagonal, and the off-diagonal 
elements are correlations to be estimated (ρji = ρij, and ρii = 1, for all 
i = 1,...,M). Multivariate probit evaluates the M-dimensional Normal 
integrals in the likelihood function. For each observation, a 
likelihood contribution is calculated for each replication, and the 
simulated likelihood contribution is the average of the values 
derived from all the replications. The simulated likelihood function 
for the sample as a whole is then maximized using standard 
methods. A detailed description of this model is shown in Greene 
(2003) and Train (2003). In this model, the governance structure is 
considered as a system of a multiple choice equation (i = 1...4; j = 
1,…..n) respective to each type of governance structure. 
 
   
                                                                                                     (1) 
 
Where:  GoverStrij = Governance structure i choice by the farmer j, 
TransAttribij = Transaction attribute i of the farmer j, InstEnvij = 
Institutional environment, Caractij = Firms characteristics, ε ij = Error 
terms and αij,  the coefficients to be estimated. 
The software package STATA is used to estimate the empirical 
version of Equations (1) using farm-level data from the 219 
respondents. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Governance structure selection 
 
Data collected from 219 pineapple farmers indicates that 
more than 90% are involved in spot market GS (Table 2) 
followed by and relational based GS (58%), association 
(41%) and outgrowing scheme (21%).  
Table 3 summarises the number of GS in which one 
farmer involved. As indicated, most of the respondents 
(80%) are involved in at least two types of governance 
structure. These categories of farmers involved multi-
governance structure are used to simultaneously select 
at least two type GS. Farmers who are exclusively 
choosing one type of GS are considered as having zero 
degree   of   multi-governance.  As   one   farmer  can  be 
 
 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝑗  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑗  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗       (1) 
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Table 1. Sample sizes of each type of farmer par location. 
 
Category of famers 
Locations/districts 
Total 
Abomey-Calavi Zè Allada Tori-Bossito Toffo 
Small-scale      [ < 1 ha]  20 (9.1) 32 (14.6) 25 (11.4) 18 (8.2) 18 8.2) 113 (51.6) 
Medium-scale  [1 – 5 ha] 19 (8.7) 19 (8.7) 17 (7.8) 12 (5.5) 13 (5.9) 80 (36.5) 
Large-scale      [ > 5 ha ] 6 (2.7) 8 (3.7) 3 (1.4) 5 (2.3) 4 (1.8) 26 (11.9) 
Total 45 (20.5) 59 (26.9) 45 (20.5) 35 (16) 35 (16) 219 (100) 
 
(*) cell percentage in brackets.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Types of governance structure identified. 
 
Types of governance structure Observation Percent (%) Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Spot market 198 90.41 0.020 0.865 0.943 
Relational 128 58.44 0.033 0.518 0.650 
Outgrowing 47 21.46 0.028 0.160 0.269 
Association 91 41.55 0.033 0.350 0.481 
Total  464 
    
 
 
 
Table 3. Number of governance structure in which a famer is involved. 
 
Degree of multi-governance  Observations Percent (%) Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Farmers with 1 type of GS  44 20.09 0. 027 0.147 0.254 
Farmers with 2 types of GS 111 50.68 0. 033 0.440 0.574 
Farmers with 3 types of GS 58 26.48 0. 029 0.206 0.324 
Farmers with 4 types of GS 6 2.74 0.011 0.006 0.049 
Total 219.00 100.00 
   
 
 
 
Table 4. Distribution of farmers respective to the farm size and the number of GS. 
 
Farm size 
Total number of GS in which famer is involved 
Total 
1 2 3 4 
Small < 1ha 28 (63.64) 67 (60.36) 18 (31.03) 0 (0) 113 (51.6) 
Medium 1 - 5ha 14 (31.82) 32 (28.83) 29 (50) 5 (83.33) 80 (36.53 
Large > 5ha 2 (4.55) 12 (10.81) 11 (18.97) 1 (16.67) 26 (11.87) 
Total 44 (100) 111 (100) 58 (100) 6 (100) 219 (100) 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 (6) = 23.9541   Pr = 0.001. (..) Column percentage in brackets.  
 
 
 
involved in one or more types of governance structures, 
this implies that the farmer has more than one exchange 
relationship.  
Considering that for each farmer, one governance 
structure is used per exchange relationship. Farmers 
indicated that the main reason of selecting multi-
governance structure is to safeguard their investment and 
avoid post harvest loses of the pineapple fruits rejected 
from international market (of weighting and sorting).  
Table 4 presents a distribution of respondents 
respective to their farm size and the number of GS in 
which they are involved. It can be inferred that most of 
the  farmers  with  low  level  of  multicity  of  GS   (that is, 
involved in one or two GS, 63 and 60%, respectively) are 
producing pineapple under small farm land (< 1 ha) while 
those with more than two GS are mostly producing on 
medium (1 to 5 ha) and large farm size (> 5 ha).  
The computed Pearson Chi2 to test at six (6) degree of 
freedom to test the differences between farmers‟ 
categories shows that there is a significant difference 
between the four (4) categories of farmers considering 
their farm size.  
Farmers with high production potentials in terms of land 
surface under pineapple production are most likely 
engaged in 3 or 4 types of GS simultaneously in 
pineapple supply chain. 
 
 
 
 
Determinant of governance structure choices 
 
Prior to the regression of the multivariate probit model, a 
factor analysis was conducted to reduce the dimensions 
of the variables. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity determines 
whether each variable is independent, and Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) determines the sampling adequacy (Chen 
and Fu, 2011). KMO takes values between 0 and 1, with 
small values meaning that overall the variables have too 
little in common to warrant a factor analysis.  
Kaiser (1974) recommends accepting values greater 
than 0.5 as barely acceptable. Values between 0.5 and 
0.7 are mediocre, values between 0.7 and 0.8 good, 
values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great and values above 
0.9 are superb (Field, 2005). According to Kaiser (1974) 
Criterion, Eigenvalues is a good criterion for determining 
a factor. Factors with Eigenvalues less than one should 
not be considered.  
The summary of computed factor loadings, the KMO 
and the Eigenvalues are presented in Appendix 1. With 
KMO values varying between 0.6 and 0.7 we can deduct 
that the sampling is fairly adequate. Bartlett's Test Chi2 
are significant at 1% (p<0.01) showing that the selected 
dependant variables for factors analysis are not 
correlated. All the selected factors have Eigenvalues 
greater than one with all factors having a variance 
superior to 0.7 responding to the variance extraction rule 
“Factors with Eigenvalues less than 0.7 should not be 
considered. The factors analysis allowed to adequately 
generating the explanatory variables included in the 
regression model. 
Additionally, the Appendix 2 and 3, respectively present 
the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the 
variables used in the multivariate probit regression. The 
result of this econometric regression is presented on 
Table 5. 
As presented in the regression output the Wald test is 
used to examine whether any of the parameters of the 
model that currently have nonzero values could be set to 
zero without any statistically significant loss in the 
model's overall fit to the data (𝛽1𝑖 = 𝛽2𝑖 = 𝛽3𝑖 = 0). It tests 
the overall significance of the variables included in the 
econometric model (McGeorge et al., 1997; Ryan and 
Watson, 2009). Results show that the Wald Chi2 is 
statically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that 
the subset of coefficients of the model are jointly 
significant and that the explanatory power of the factors 
included in the model is satisfactory.  
The Likelihood ratio test is also significant, implying that 
the null hypothesis of all the ρ (Rho) values are jointly 
equal to zero, is rejected. This is shows the goodness-of-
fit of the model. Basically, the ρ-values explain the 
degree of correlation between each pair of the dependant 
variable levels (each type of governance structure).  
Individually considered, we found three ρ-values 
statistically significant. The ρ31 (correlation between the 
outgrowing  scheme  GS  and  the  spot  market), the ρ32  
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(correlation between outgrowing scheme and the 
relational based GS) and ρ43 (correlation between the 
farmers‟ association and outgrowing scheme) are 
negatively correlated and statistically significant at 5% 
critical level (P< 0.05). This generally implies that farmers 
involved in the outgrowing scheme governance structure 
are less likely to be involved in another type of 
governance as well; showing the specificity and 
exclusivity of this type of transaction arrangement in the 
pineapple supply chain. According to transaction cost 
economics, dependencies of GS are the result of 
switching costs, investments worth less or nothing 
outside specific governance (Williamson, 1975). 
Looking at the factors affecting the choice of each type 
of governance structure, we notice that different factors 
determine the farmer‟s decision (Appendix 1). First, the 
human specific investment is significantly and negatively 
correlated with the spot market GS. This shows that there 
is no specific investment made in the transaction under 
market governance, neither in the knowledge acquisition 
and capacity building with respect to production 
practices, nor when shifting to another product or buyer. 
This result is in line with the transaction cost theory 
stating that the lower the human and asset specificity, the 
more likely the actors are involved in less constraining 
and less integrated arrangements. 
Also the specific human investment is found to be 
significantly and positively correlated in the relational 
based GS. This implies that the choice of relational based 
governance structure, where farmers preferably chose 
their buyers based on social relationships (familial and/or 
friendship), is determined by the farmers‟ capacity to 
invest in human assets. This may be justified by the fact 
in this kind of buyer-seller relationships there is high 
degree of trust between the parties involved. 
The transaction connectedness refers to how the 
transactions differ in how they are connected to other 
transactions in the chain (see Appendix 1 for more details 
on factors loading for transaction connectedness).  
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argued that when the 
transactions have a strong connection, strong 
coordination governance is favourable. We find a 
negative and statistically significant correlation between 
the transaction connectedness and the spot market 
governance structure, on one hand, and a positive and 
significant correlation with outgrowing scheme and farmer 
association type of governance structure on the other 
hand.  
The transaction connectedness has been measured by 
the farmers‟ awareness of the demand attributes of the 
customers of the first hand customers, which can be a 
trader, a processing company or an exporter. The 
transaction connectedness also considers the connection 
between a farmer‟s production system and agronomic 
practices (floral induction treatment, Ethephon application 
and harvesting period) and the second hand buyer‟s 
demand  attributes  and quality requirement. We can infer  
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Table 5. Multivariate probit estimation for governance structure choice. 
 
Factors description  
Types of governance structures 
Spot market Relational Outgrow Association 
Transaction attributes 
Human specific investment -0.28* 0.28* 0.19 -0.12 
Asset specificity investment 0.12 0.61*** 0.16 0.16 
Uncertain behavior 0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 
Connectedness of transaction -0.26* -0.04 0.30** 0.31** 
Market stability -0.13 -0.10 0.23** -0.30* 
      
Institutional environment  Institutional support -0.10 -0.22 -0.22* 1.62*** 
      
Market attributes 
Predefined marketing arrangement 0.34** -0.17 0.02 0.48** 
Diversification of preferences -0.12 0.09 -0.24* 0.00 
Permanente pineapple demand 0.14 -0.45*** 0.03 0.22 
      
Farm and farmer‟s characteristics 
Farm size 0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.65** 
Ratio pineapple farm/total farm land -0.01 -0.51 1.38*** -0.81 
Geographical position to market  -0.21 -0.07 0.05 0.09 
Trust and commitment -0.26* 1.69*** 0.02 0.00 
Age 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.01 
Experience in pineapple farming  0.05* 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
Education level 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.27 
Bargaining power 0.06 0.01 -0.30 0.08 
Dynamic capability  -0.29 0.18 0.06 1.36*** 
      
Constant 1.31 0.90 -1.31* -2.92** 
ρ21 -0.14 
ρ31 -0.33** 
ρ41 0.14 
ρ32 -0.25** 
ρ42 0.07 
ρ43 -0.36** 
Number of observations 219 
Wald chi2 (df) 373.68 (76)*** 
Likelihood ratio test Ho : ρ21 = ρ31 = ρ41 = ρ32 = ρ42 = ρ43 = 0;  chi2(6) =  11.5727* 
 
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, and *** P < 0.01. 
 
 
 
from that result that the more farmers are engaged in a 
highly coordinated type of GS, the more likely they are 
aware of the end consumer‟s quality requirements, and 
the more they adjust production practices to fulfil the 
demand. It can be inferred that the more “hierarchy” the 
GS is expected to be positively correlated with 
transaction connectedness. 
One positive and favourable indicator for choosing an 
outgrowing scheme is the stability and consistency of the 
buyer preferences. This factor positively and significantly 
correlates with outgrowing scheme GS choice and 
negatively with farmers‟ association GS choice. The 
demand quantity is less stable and less consistent with 
farmers involved in association based GS in contrary with 
those involved in outgrowing scheme. 
Another construct that was considered in explaining the 
farmers‟ choice of a governance structure is the 
institutional environment in which he is transacting. Under 
institutional environment, we considered the facilities and 
supports received from private and public services for 
product quality and income improvement. These include 
technical and financial support, training on good 
agronomical practices, quality norms and standards, 
market facilities, etc. Results show that the choice for a 
farmers‟ association governance structure is positively 
and significantly influenced by differences in the form of 
institutional assistance received by farmers.  
Considering the social capital and collective actions 
that are observed in associations, the public and private 
sectors   are     most    likely    to   support    groups    and  
 
 
 
 
associations, rather than a bilateral transaction, such an 
outgrowing scheme or a relational based GS. Also, the 
national policies of agricultural development give more 
priority in assisting collective actions (association, 
cooperatives) than individuals. 
Market attributes were also considered in assessing the 
farmer‟s choice of governance structure. Among the 
different indicators we used to measure the market 
attributes (pre-agreed market arrangement based on 
price and demanded quality, and the requirements of 
specific production practices and the quantity by the 
buyer. The results show a positive significant correlation 
with two types of governance structure: the spot market 
and the associative GS. For the first one, an unexpected 
correlation sign is obtained. The hypothesis was that 
when more pre-agreements exist in market 
arrangements, farmers are more likely to go for an 
integrated type of governance structure to safeguard their 
investments (Williamson, 1985).  
The research findings show that within a spot market 
transaction arrangement, the quantity and price can be 
agreed at the moment and the place where the 
transaction takes place. It is important to note that in the 
pineapple supply chain, under a spot arrangement, the 
market agreements are generally informal (oral) without 
any written and formal engagement. The drawback of this 
informal arrangement is that the agreed transaction can 
unexpectedly be changed at any moment of the 
transaction, which generally is not the case within a 
farmer association GS. 
We also found that the farmer‟s preference to be 
involved in several exchange relationship determines his 
choice of governance structure. The buyers in outgrowing 
scheme GS present a less diverse requirement. This 
result is in line with our previous result on the stability of 
buyer requirements over time. 
As a control variable, the farmers and the farm 
characteristics have been included in multivariate probit 
model. Results show that farmers involved in an 
association are those having many hectares for 
pineapple production. As the farmers are generally not 
only producing pineapple, the importance land devoted to 
pineapple production as compared to other crops was 
calculated using the ratio of land used for pineapple 
cultivation to the total acreage of cultivated land in the 
year of 2009. We can infer from the regression model 
that the farmers under outgrowing scheme arrangement 
devote more of their land to pineapple production as 
compared to other categories of farmers. 
It was previously demonstrated that the spot market GS 
is characterised by less human specific investment while 
the reputation based GS is characterised by a high 
specific investment. The argument used was based on 
the degree of trust between chain actors. Considering 
trust and commitment as variables allowed testing this 
assumption. The findings show that the choice of 
relational based GS is favoured by the high and 
significant    degree    of   trust   and   commitment   between  
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buyer and seller involved in the transaction. By contrast, 
the result also shows that the spot market arrangement is 
made by farmers with low trust and commitment to their 
buyers. 
Other control variables include the farmer‟s age, his 
experience in pineapple farming, his education level 
(schooling), and his bargaining power with the buyer and 
dynamic capacity. Among these factors, the farmers‟ 
experience in pineapple production and his dynamic 
capability (changing production practices in order to 
respond to the market demand) are shown to be 
positively significant at 10 and 5% critical levels (Table 4), 
respectively, for the spot market and the farmers‟ 
associations GS. This implies that the more dynamic 
farmers are generally choosing associative relationships 
and those with a lot of farming experience are found 
bargaining under a spot market form of arrangement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The transaction cost economy provides many insights 
into the choice of governance structure, suggesting that 
everything remaining constant, the rational actor will 
chose a governance structure that is best performing in 
minimizing the production and transaction costs. This 
article provides empirical evidence to the transaction cost 
theory and one step further in the Williamson‟s attributes 
of transaction by emphasizing the connectedness as a 
determinant transaction attribute that worth consideration 
in analysing the choice of the governance structure in 
less developed counties like Benin.  
A new construct of “multiple-governance” structure is 
investigated in order to increase the understanding of 
how and why farmers select among these governance 
structures and what guides their decision.  
The Multi-governance choice has been observed as a 
strategy of farmers to safeguard their investments. This 
strategy established by small-scale farmers to sell the 
different categories of their product quality to different 
supply chains was also analysed.  
Farmer involved in the outgrowing scheme GS are less 
likely to be involved in another type of governance as 
well; showing the specificity and exclusivity of this type of 
transaction arrangement in the pineapple supply chain.  
With regard to the choice of each type of GS, results 
can be used as powerful tool in defining intervention 
strategies in promoting the contract enforcement in bi - or 
multilateral partnerships in agri-food chains.  
This paper does not investigate the influence of the 
selected GS on the pineapple quality and farmer‟s 
income, which are determinant for policy 
recommendations. Further investigation may consider 
these aspects. 
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